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Damages-Mines and Minerals-Measure of Damages for Les-
see's Failure to Mine Under Royalty Agreement-Mining lease pro-
vided that 3o0,ooo cubic yards of auriferous gravel should be mined the
first year and that lessor should receive a royalty of ten per cent of the
gross value. Evidence showed that there was over 300,000 yards of gravel
with a gross value, in recoverable gold, of $15o,ooo. Lessor brought action
for damages for breach when lessee failed to mine and repudiated lease.
Held, (one judge dissenting) lessor is entitled to recover full amount of
royalty he would have received if lessee had performed. No deduction
allowed for value of mineral unmined. Gold Mining and Water Company
v. Swinerton et al., i42 P. (2d) 22 (Cal. 1943).
Compensation is the fundamental principle of awarding damages for
breach of contract.' The endeavor is to put the plaintiff in as good a posi-
tion as he would have been in, had there been complete performance.2 It
is never the purpose in awarding damages, however, to place the plaintiff
in a better position than he would have been in had the defendant fulfilled
the obligations of his agreement.3 Where a contract provides for liquidated
damages in the event of failure to perform, they are legally recoverable if
the sum agreed upon represents a good faith effort to predetermine actual
damage and the harm caused by the breach is incapable or difficult of accu-
rate estimation.4 So, where there is a breach of an agreement to mine,
wherein there is a provision that the operator shall pay a stated royalty
on a specified quantity of mineral whether he mines it or not, it is clear
that the operator should be held liable under his express covenant." When
there is no such covenant, however, the courts appear to have difficulty in
applying what they agree is the rule in awarding damages.8 The issue
generally becomes one of whether the lessor is entitled to recover the entire
royalty that he would have received if lessee had performed; or whether
the amount of the damages must be something less because the lessor still
has the ore. Those courts which hold the latter view favor either award-
ing only the interest on the amount that the lessor would have received
as royalty; 7 or deducting from the amount of the royalty the value of the
i. McCoRMicx, DAMAGES (1935) 560, 561; WmLIsTON, CoNTRAcrs (1937) § 1338;
RESTATEMENT, Coi mAcrs (1932) § 329.
2. Ibid.
3. CAL. CIV. CODE (Deering, 1937) § 3358, cited by the dissent in the instant case
and pointed to as a fundamental principle of contract law at p. 35.
4. McCoam cx, DAMAGES (1935) 59g, 6oo; RESTATEMENT, CONTRAcTs (1932)
§ 339.
5. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co. v. Martin, 124 Fed. 313 (C. C. A. 3d, 19o3);
Powell v. Burroughs, 54 Pa. 329 (1867).
6. Instant case at 34.
7. "So far as disclosed, they (lessors) have lost nothing more than interest on the
value of productions obtainable had defendant exercised that degree of diligence .
due. . . " Grass v. Big Creek Development Co., 75 W. Va. 719, 732, 84 S. E. 750,
755, 57 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1057, 1O65 (I915).
See also Cherry v. Miller (1815) 1 Prrrs. L. J. 98, where it was held that lessor
is not entitled to recovery of full royalty but that the measure of damages "must be at
least equal to the interest of the money which the plaintiff might have received if the
tenants had worked the quarry as they ought to have done."
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ore unmined.8 Many cases are cited as authority for granting the full
royalty that are not truly in point. Some such cases have to do with
agreements in which there is provision for liquidated damages.9 Others
deal with oil and gas leases 1 0 and are distinguishable on the ground that
these minerals are of a highly fugacious quality while gold, coal, sulphur
and other stationary minerals are not.1 Those courts which adhere to
the so-called royalty rule rarely offer convincing reasons for extending the
award of damages beyond its fundamental aim of giving compensation and
no more. 2 The court in the instant case permits a lessor to have his
royalty and still retain the ore on the assumed extraction of which it was
computed. No matter what analogy be drawn, 8 it is difficult to conceive
of satisfactory grounds for o doing.
Evidence-Labor Union-Privilege Against Self-Incrimination-
A subpoena duces tecum addressed to a labor union required it to produce
before a grand jury certain books and records belonging to the union. The
defendant, assistant supervisor of the union, appeared before the grand
jury and read a statement refusing to turn over these records, claiming
immunity both for the union and himself under the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments to the Federal Constitution.' The grand jury filed a present-
ment charging the defendant with being a contumacious witness. The
District Court determined that defendant could not refuse to produce the
records of the union on ground that they would incriminate him, and
defendant appeals. Held, reversed and remanded. If defendant is a mem-
ber of the union and the books would tend to incriminate him as an indi-
vidual, the claim to the privilege should be allowed. United States v.
8. ". . . the measure of damages (for coal which should have been mined, but
was not) is the difference between the stipulated rate of compensation and the value of
the coal in the mine." Lyon v. Miller, 24 Pa. 392, 395 (I855).
To the same effect, see Whiteside v. Rocky Mountain Fuel Co., ioi F. (2d) 765
(C. C. A. ioth, I939) (coal mining lease); Fail and Miles v. McRee, 36 Ala. 61
(i86o) (timber); Milligan v. Haggerty, 296 Mich. 62, 295 N. W. 56o (I941) (brick
clay) ; Kille v. Reading Iron Works, i4i Pa. 440, 21 At. 666 (i89I) (iron ore).
9. Note 5 supra.
io. Julian Petroleum Corp. v. Courtney Petroleum Co., 22 F. (2d) 360 (C. C. A.
9th, 1927) ; Fallis v. Julian Petroleum Co., ioS Cal. App. 559, 292 Pac. 158 (1930) ;
Daughetee v. Ohio Oil Co., 15i Ill. App. io2 (igio), aff'd, 263 Ill. 518, 105 N. E. 308
(I914) ; Junction Oil and Gas Co. v. Pratt, 99 Okla. i4, 225 Pac. 717 (1924) ; Brad-
ford Oil Co. v. Blair, 113 Pa. 83, 4 Ad. 218 (1886) ; Texas Pacific Coal and Oil Co. v.
Barker et al., 117 Tex. 418, 6 S. W. (2d) IO31, 6o A. L. R. 936 (1928).
ii. In Bradford Oil Co. v. Blair, 113 Pa. 83, 4 At. 218 (i886), the court said,
"We do not think damages for not securing flowing oil are to be ascertained exactly
as if it were a stationary mineral.
"If oil be not utilized at a proper time it may be lost forever by reason of others
operating nearby. Not so with a stationary mineral. It remains for future develop-
ment." See also, dissent in instant case at 35.
12. Macon v. Trowbridge, 38 Colo. 330, 87 Pac. 1147 (i9o6) ; Freeport Sulphur
Co. et al. v. Sulphur Royalty Co., 117 Tex. 439, 6 S. W. (2d) 1039, 6o A. L. R. 890
(1928). But see, Cawood v. Hall Land and Mining Co., I68 S. W. (2d) 366 (Ct. of
App. of Ky., 1943) ; Gilmore v. Ontario Iron Co., 86 N. Y. 455 (i88i).
13. Dissent in instant case at 36, where Justice Edmonds compares the mining
lease to(i) an agreement of the mine owner to sell a minimum of 300,000 cubic yards
of gravel, the sale price being the stipulated royalty of ten per cent of the gross recov-
ery value of the gold content, and (2) a covenant for the performance of services.
i. On'the proposition that these two amendments are to be read together see, Cor-
win, The Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause (i93o) 29
MIcH. L. Rnv. i.
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White, 137 F. (2d) 24 (C. C. A. 3d, 1943), cert. granted, 64 Sup. Ct.
189 (Nov. 8, 1943).
It has been the well established rule since the case of Hale v. Henkel 2
that a corporation charged with a crime cannot invoke the privilege against
self incrimination. Wigmore points out that most of the decisions have
been based upon the theory that the state has reserved powers of visitation
upon the corporate records and hence the privilege is unavailable.8 How-
ever, there are more basic reasons militating against recognizing the priv-
ilege in such an entity; first, the sentiment of fundamental fairness which
recoils from forcing another human being to supply by his own act the
incriminating evidence, applies only between man and man, and is not
applicable where the accused is merely an artificial entity; and second, "a
main object of the privilege" 4 i. e., requiring the prosecution to search for
other evidence, is not present where an artificial entity is involved, for there
is but little available material apart from such documents. It is also well
recognized that an employee or officer of a corporation cannot refuse to
produce the records of the corporation on the ground that they will incrim-
inate him.5 However, if the documents are really his own personal records,
although nominally those of the corporation, he is protected by the priv-
ilege to the extent that these records incriminate him., The fundamental
problem presented by the instant case is the extent to which the court will
apply the analogy of the corporation to the labor union. The majority
based its decision upon the fact that the state has no reserved power of
visitation upon the union records as it does upon those of a corporation,
that therefore the analogy should not be applied, and concluded that the
papers were the private documents of the union members, disregarding
any concept of the union as an entity. In short, all the defendant had to
do to prove that these were his papers was to prove that he was a member
of the union. Then, if they tended to incriminate him, he could withhold
them by pleading the privilege. This holding extends the scope of the
privilege beyond the limits set by the corporation cases. 7  The minority,
after recognizing that the union differs from the corporation in that the
state has no power of visitation upon it, reasoned that because in many
other respects these two types of associations are treated in analogous
fashion due to their basic character as entities,8 the analogy should
2. 201 U. S. 43, 26 Sup. Ct. 370, 5o L. Ed. 652 (19o6) ; see also, International Coal
M. Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 152 Fed. 557 (E. D. Pa. 1907) ; American Lithographic
Co. v. Werckmeister, 221 U. S. 603, 31 Sup. Ct. 676, 55 L. Ed. 873 (1911).
3. 8 WIGmoR, EvIDENcE (3d ed. 1940) § 2259a.
4. Ibid.
5. Wilson v. U. S., 221 U. S. 361, 31 Sup. Ct. 538, 55 L. Ed. 771 (1911) ; Mc-
Alister v, Henkel, 2oi U. S. 90, 26 Sup. Ct 385, 5o L. Ed. 671 (19o6) ; See 8 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 2259a, n. 2.
6. McAlister v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 90, 26 Sup. Ct. 385, 5o L. Ed. 671 (i9o6) ; Wil-
son v. U. S., 221 U. S. 361, 31 Sup. Ct. 538, 55 L. Ed. -77I (191I) ; Fuller v. U. S., 31
F. (2d) 747 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929).
7. Whether the scope of the privilege should be extended or narrowed has been
the subject of many and varied controversies, some of which are discussed in the fol-
lowing: Knox, Self-Incrimination (1925) 74 U. OF PA. L. REv. 139; Bruncken, Mak-
ing the Accused Testify Against Himself (1920) 5 MARQ. L. REV. 82; Corwin, The
Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause (930) 29 MIcH. L.
REV. I; Irvine, The Third Degree and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination (1928)
13 CORN. L. Q. 211.
8. That labor unions have for many purposes been treated as entities is a well-
established principle, especially in the Federal Courts. United Mine Workers v. Coro-
nado Coal Company, 259 U. S. 344, 42 Sup. Ct. 57o, 66 L. Ed. 975, 27 A. L. R. 762
(1922) (An unincorporated labor union is an entity distinct from its members, and as
such may sue or be sued in its common name) ; 2 TELLER, LABOR DISPUTES AND COL-
LECTVE BARGAINING (1940) § 463.
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apply for the purpose of the privilegeY9 Applying this reasoning we
reach the conclusion that the records of the union are not the personal
records of the individual members but belong to the entity-the union.
Under this holding the mere fact of membership in the union would be
insufficient to enable the member to plead the privilege. As stated by
dissenting Judge Biggs: ". . . the defendant is in the position of any
individual who has in his possession books and records belonging to others
and is called upon to produce them before a grand jury." 10 It seems that
this dissenting opinion does not extend the scope of the privilege and that
under it the test would still be the same as that laid down in the Mc-
Alister case 11 i. e., unless the records are virtually his own private records
he will not be able to plead the privilege.'
2
Injunction-Erroneously Issued Injunction as a Valid Defense to
a Criminal Proceeding-Classified I-A 1 by his draft board on Decem-
ber 14, 1942, defendant appealed as far as possible and without success
within the Selective Service system. On March 5, 1943, the United
States district court for the eastern district of Pennsylvania ordered that
defendant's induction be stayed, "pending further order of this court."
On March 8, 1943, the judge issued another order vacating the board's
induction order, and ordering the board to give defendant a new hearing,
but on March I1, 1943, the order of March 8 was withdrawn. The order
of March 5 was therefore still in effect. Defendant was ordered by the
draft board on March 26, 1943, to report for induction on April 7, 1943,
but defendant failed to appear, telegraphing the board that the March 5
order had stayed his induction. On Jfine 2, 1943, defendant's original
complaint in the district court, seeking review of his classification was
dismissed, and on the same day defendant was ordered to report for induc-
9. The increasing growth and importance of labor unions as entities is recognized
by Congress in the following legislation: The right to collective bargaining is estab-
lished by the National Labor Relations Act, 49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. §157
(1942) ; labor unions are given a special status in respect to the Anti-Trust laws of
the United States, the Clayton Act, 38 STAT. 738 (914), 29 U. S. C. A. § 52 (i942),
I5 U. S. C. A. § i7 (1941) ; for certain purposes labor unions are protected against
injunction by the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. § 104
(1942). The following statutes, making embezzlement of union funds by an officer of
the union a special crime, clearly recognize that the union is an entity distinct from
its members: NEE. Comp. STAT. (Dorsey, 1929) tit. 28, § 555; Rev. Laws of N. H.
(1942) c. 450, § 29. The following cases illustrate the same point: People v. Herbert,
162 Misc. 817, 295 N. Y. S. 25, (1937) ; People ex rel. Murphy v. Crane, 8o App. Div.
2o2, 8o N. Y. S. 408 (1903) (officer of union converting union funds guilty of larceny) ;
see also Starr v. Chase (924) 4 D. L. R. 55, 1924 S. C. R. 495, Can.; see dissenting
opinion of the instant case at 28, n. 7, 8; 2 TELLER, LABOR DiSPUTES AND COLLECTVE
BARGAINING (1940) § 463.
i0. Instant case at 27.
ii. McAlister v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 90, 26 Sup. Ct. 385, 50 L. Ed. 671 (igo6).
12. The following decisions of lower Federal courts lend support to the dissenting
opinion: United States v. B. Goedde & Co., 40 F. Supp. 523. 534 (E. D. Ill. 1941) ;
United States v. Greater New York L. P. Chamber of Commerce, 34 F. (2d) 967, 968
(S. D. N. Y. 1929), aff'd, 47 F. (2d) 156 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931), cert. denied, 283 U. S.
837, 51 Sup. Ct. 486, 75 L. Ed. 1448 (ig3I) ; United States v. Lumber Products Ass'n.,
42 F. Supp. 91o (M. D. Calif. 1942); In re Local Union No. 55o, United Brotherhood
of Carpenters and Joiners of America, 33 F. Supp. 544 (M. D. Calif. I94I).
i. Available for general military service when found acceptable to the land or
naval forces. Selective Service Regulations (2d ed.) 622.11.
322 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
tion on June 4, 1943, "in obedience to the order dated March 26th, 1943."
Again defendant failed to appear, alleging that the order of June 2 was
not a separate induction order, on the proper form, but merely a re-noti-
fication of the March 26 order, issued while the injunction was still in
effect. On June 28, 1943, defendant was indicted for failure to obey the
March 26 order. 2 These circumstances have aptly been called a "comedy
of errors." 8 Held, conviction reversed.
4  United States v. Maitcuso, 139
F. (2d) 90 (C. C. A. 3d, 1943).
It is by now settled law that a draftee may not seek civil review of
his draft board's decision to induct him, but must first submit to military
authority and seek his release by an action of habeas corpus.
5 The court
order of the District Judge staying defendant's induction was therefore
erroneous. But this should not make the injunction any less effectual as
a defense to a criminal prosecution for acting pursuant to the injunction.
It is well settled that a mistake of law is not a valid defense to a criminal
action; 1 but where the defendant has obeyed a court order, he has been
protected thereby. 7 The Supreme Court of the United States sanctioned
this form of proceeding as a method of testing allegedly unconstitutional
statutes," and the injunction was held a good defense to a criminal prose-
cution for their violation." In the instant case, however, the injunction
was invalid. But it was held that as the injunction was valid on its face,
and the District Judge was acting within his jurisdiction, although that
jurisdiction was erroneously exercised, defendant was entitled to rely on
it. An opposite conclusion might cause great injustice; for it would bur-
den the defendant with the hazard that the injunction was wrongfully
issued.10 In many cases this would make the injunction of dubious value,
for if improperly issued the defendant would be subjected to excessive pen-
alties.:" It would be grossly unjust to hold a defendant responsible in a
2. "Any person charged as herein provided with the duty of carrying out any of
the provisions of this Act, or the rules or regulations made or directions given there-
under, who shall knowingly fail or neglect to perform such duty . . . shall, upon
conviction in the district court of the United States having jurisdiction thereof, be
punished by imprisonment for not more than five years or a fine of not more than
$io,ooo, or by both. . . ." Selective Training and Service Act of I94O, 54 STAT. 894
(1940), 50 U. S. C. A. §311 (Supp. I943).
3. Instant case at go.
4. Talbo v. United States (i944) 12 U. S. L. WEEK 4113.
5. United States v. Bowles, I3I F. (2d) 818 (C. C. A. 3d, 1942), aff'd on other
grounds, 319 U. S. 33, 63 Sup. Ct. 922, 87 L. Ed. 99 (1943) ; Drumheller v. Berks
County Local Board No. 1, 13o F. (2d) 61o (C. C. A. 3d, 1942). Contra: Ex parte
Stewart, 47 F. Supp. 42o (S. D. Cal. 1942). Note (943) g U. OF PA. L. REv. 75I,
759. For an argument contra, see dissenting opinion by Biggs, J., in Ex parte Can-
tanzaro, 138 F. (2d) ioo (C. C. A. 3d, 1943).
6. HOLmErs, THE CoMMoN LANw (188I) 47; Keedy, Ignorance and Mistake in the
Criminal Law (29o8) 22 HARV. L. REV. 75, 88.
7. There have been very few cases in which criminal proceedings have been insti-
tuted in this situation. See Hall and Seligman, Mistake of Law and Mens Rea (1942)
8 U. OF CHI. L. RES. 641, 673, 674.
8. Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 223, 28 Sup. Ct 441, 52 L. Ed. 714 (19o8). See
Note (2928) 26 MIcH. L. REv. 425, discussing the injunction as a method of testing
the constitutionality of rate statutes, violations of which would involve heavy penalties.
9. State v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 230 Minn. 144, 153 N. W. 320 (2925).
io, "We do not think the layman participating in a law suit is required to know
more law than the judge." Instant case at 92.
ii. In an analogous situation, an injunction forbade prosecution of defendant un-
der a statute pending a decision on its constitutionality, but after its constitutionality
was upheld, the injunction was held no defense to a prosecution for acts in violation of
the statute committed during the operation of the injunction. This decision forces de-
fendant to gamble on the unconstitutionality, virtually negativing the injunction. State
v. Wadhams Oil Co., 149 Wis. 58, I34 N. W. 1122 (I912).
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situation where he followed the order of a judge who himself did not know
the law, although it has been so held.
1 2
Judgments-Wrongful Death Statute-Res Judicata as to Party
Whose Claim Was Not Presented-The plaintiff, as administratrix of
husband's estate, brought this action for damages to her as an individual
because of the death of her husband as a result of defendant's negligence.
Defendants pleaded a former judgment in favor of a prior administrator
for the same death as a complete bar. In the prior suit the administrator
had alleged the deceased was unmarried, although the present plaintiff
then claimed to be his wife and was later so adjudicated in a separate pro-
ceeding.' Held, (one Justice dissenting) the prior judgment is res judi-
cata. Wilson-Harris v. Southwest Telephone Co., 141 P. (2d) 986 (1943).
Wrongful death statutes ' have generally been interpreted as granting
only one right of action against the person causing the death.' But the
states are divided as to the meaning of the words "one right of action."
Some states hold that once an authorized person brings an action, any
other action for the wrongful death, for whatever reason, is barred or
merged in the former recovery.' A minority of states hold that the stat-
ute means that the suit must have been based on the claims of all the
beneficiaries, and there is no bar or merger against persons whose claims
were not included 0-but of course there might be collateral estoppel as
to the matters actually litigated and determined in the prior trial. 7 Thus,
under the first interpretation a posthumous child, even though deemed to
be in existence at the time of the death, may not sue when born,' while,
under the second interpretation he may sue.' The conflict is between logic
and justice. The statute does not give the beneficiaries rights of action.' 0
12. Pursuant to a statute whose purpose was to prevent the spread of disease, the
governor of Idaho forbade the entry of sheep into the state. Defendant obtained an
order from the federal court enjoining the state from prosecuting defendant for driving
sheep into Idaho, pending a decision on the constitutionality of the statute. For six
months, defendant imported sheep, until the federal court decided that it had not had
jurisdiction, and voided the injunction. Defendant was then convicted for the acts
committed within the six month period. Evidence of the injunction was held irrelevant.
State v. Keller, 8 Idaho 699, 70 Pac. lO51 (1902).
I. Love, Adm'r. v. Wilson, 181 Okla. 558, 75 P. (2d) 876 (1938).
2. Instant statute: OKLA. STAT. ANN. (941) tit. 12, § 1053.
3. Daubert v. Western Meat Co., 139 Cal. 480, 73 Pac. 244 (19o3) ; Gulf and S. I.
R. Co. v. Bradley, 11o Miss. 152, 6g So. 666 (915) ; 16 Am. JuP. § 151, p. l03.
4. See Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment (942) 56 HARv. L. REV. 1, 2, for
the distinction between "bar" and "merger."
5. Note 3 supra; Salmon v. Rathjens, 152 Cal. 29o, 92 Pac. 733 (1907) ; Parmley
v. Pleasant Valley Coal Co., 64 Utah 125, 228 Pac. 557 (1924) ; 2 BLACK, JUDGMENTS
(2d ed. 1902) § 674. Cf. Watkins v. Nutting, 17 Cal. (2d) 490, 110 P. (2d) 384 (1941).
6. Nelson v. Galveston, H. and S. A. Ry., 78 Tex. 621, 14 S. W. 1021 (189o).
7. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS (1942) § 45.
8. Note 3 supra.
9. Note 6 supra.
io. Note 2 supra; St Louis, S. F. Ry. Co. v. Thompson, i39 Okla. 142, 281 Pac.
565 (1929). This is the majority rule, e. g., Craig v. Sunset Lumber Co., 189 N. C.
137, 126 S. E. 312 (1925) ; Muzychuk v. Yellow Cab Co., 343 Pa. 335, 22 A. (2d) 67o
(1941).
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It gives one person a right of action," the amount of recovery dependent
on the damages sustained by all statutory beneficiaries, and the proceeds
of the resulting judgment divisible among the various beneficiaries accord-
ing to the terms of the statute.12  In the instant case the former personal
representative had brought a suit for the wrongful death. He thus bound ' 8
the present plaintiff, who succeeded him as personal representative, 4 and
all the beneficiaries, 15 since -"the person whose real interests are involved
is bound by and entitled to the benefits of res judicata." 16 It is immate-
rial that he did not present some of the factors on which the amount of
the recovery depended,' or that he failed to use due care in the prose-
cution of the suit,' or that the beneficiaries had no knowledge of the suit.19
Res judicata is a rule of public policy and secondarily for the benefit of the
litigants. 20  However, the merit of justice lies in the counter-argument
that in point of fact the personal representative did not represent the
omitted beneficiary. 21 It is true that the defendant has not paid for all
the damages his act incurred, but the defendant had only a passive part
ii. It has been held that a prior action by a party not entitled to sue under the
statute does not bar an action by the correct statutory beneficiaries. Davis v. Robin-
son, So Cal. App. (2d) 700, 123 P. (2d) 894 (1942).
12. St. Louis and S. F. Ry. Co. v. Goode, 42 Okla. 784, 142 Pac. 1185 (1914) ; 16
AM. Jun. § 277, P. 118.
13. That is, assuming the suit by the former personal representative was valid.
See Thompson v. So. Lumber Co., 113 Ark. 38o, 168 S. W. io68 (1914), where it was
stated that the omitted party must join all the statutory beneficiaries in the second suit,
thus implying that the first suit had no effect. A suit by the omitted party alone was
prohibited. But cf. Watkins v. Nutting, 17 Cal. (2d) 490, 110 P. (2d) 384 (941),
where it was held that a suit by some, but not alL of the heirs, was not the act
authorized by the statute. However, in Oklahoma, when plaintiff brings suit in a rep-
resentative capacity, failure to mention one or more of the beneficiaries does not defeat
the right to maintain the action. St. Louis, S. F. Ry. Co. v. Thompson, 139 Okla. 142,
281 Pac. 565 (1929).
Pennsylvania requires the plaintiff to set forth the names and last known addresses
of all beneficiaries and to give them notice of the suit. The plaintiff representative is
subject to removal by the beneficiaries. (GooDmcn-AmiAM, §2204.1.) The instant
problem has not arisen as yet in Pennsylvania, and since the court supervises the above
procedure, it is hoped that it will not. However, it would seem to be impossible to
guard against actual fraud on the part of the representative.
14. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS (1942) § 8o.
15. However, if the statute makes "heirs" the beneficiaries, and the personal rep-
resentative brings the suit in a foreign jurisdiction where "heirs" does not include all
those contemplated by the state statute, it has been held that the pa-ties thus denied
relief may sue again in the statute state, and the foreign judgment is not res judicata.
Spokane v. Inland Empire R. R. Co. v. Whitley, 237 U. S. 487, 35 Sup. Ct. 655, 59 L.
Ed. lo6o, L. R. A. 1915 F. 736.
16. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS (1942) § 85, comment a.
17. Id. at § 85.
18. Id. at comnrent f.
19. Id. at comment d.
20. Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment (1942) 56 HARV. L. REV. i; Note
(1943) 91 U. OF PA. L. REv. 467.
21. Atlantic Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Kessee, iii F. (2d) 657, 66o (194o). How-
ever, the statute in that case provided that the jury find and direct the amount of dis-
tribution to each beneficiary. In Oklahoma, according to St. Louis, S. F. Ry. Co. v.
Thompson, 139 Okla. 142, 281 Pac. 565 (1929), all beneficiaries may participate in the
judgment. Thus the facts in the Atlantic case render the decision still more unjust
than in the instant case, since the plaintiff could not share in the judgment already
obtained because the jury had not directed any portion of it to him.
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in bringing about that result--the cause was in the personal representa-
tive,22 who should be held liable to the present plaintiff.?
Taxation-Es.tate Tax-Deductibility of Charitable Bequest of
Remainder When Corpus Might Be Invaded for Benefit of Life
Tenant-A testamentary trust gave the income to widow for her life
and thereafter the principal was to go to certain named charities. The
will permitted the executor-trustee to invade the corpus when he, in his
sole discretion, deemed wise for the comfort or happiness of the widow.:
The executor-trustee, in filing the estate tax return, sought to deduct from
the gross estate the bequests to charity.2 Held (two justices dissenting 2),
affirming the ruling of the Circuit Court 4 which reversed the Board of
Tax Appeals, 5 that permission to invade corpus makes the gifts to charity
so uncertain that no deduction can be allowed. Merchants National Bank
of Boston v. Commissioner, 64 Sup. Ct. io8, 88 L. Ed. 55 (i943).
22. Where the personal representative was also a statutory beneficiary and failed
to include her own claim as an individual, it was held in Walker v. Etcheverry, 42 Cal.
App. (2d) 472, 109 P. (2d) 385 (i940, that she was estopped from bringing another
action for individual damages.
23. In this case it has been decided below, in an action to vacate the judgment,
that the personal representative was not guilty of fraud. (Instant case at 989-99o.)
However, by St. Louis and S. F. Ry. Co. v. Goode, 42 Okla. 784, 142 Pac. ii85 (914),
the personal representative is a trustee for the beneficiaries under the definition given
in RESTATEmENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 6, comment h, and should be liable for a breach of
trust according to § 177.
As to compromise or settlement of suit: Hartigan v. So. Pac. R. Co., 86 Cal. 142,
24 Pac. 85I (890) (Executors compromise of suit in which widow was heard, and
which court supervised, was held to be a bar to a subsequent action by the widow.)
Harris v. Rex Coal Co., i77 Ky. 63o, 197 S. W. 1075 (917) (A fraudulent settlement
by the administrator does not bar a subsequent suit by the statutory beneficiaries.).
i. The will authorized the trustee to invade the corpus "at such time or times as
my said Trustee shall in its sole discretion deem wise and proper for the comfort, sup-
port, inaintenance, and/or happiness of my said wife, and it is my wish and will that in
the exercise of its discretion with reference to such payments from the principal of the
trust fund to my said wife, May L. Field, my said Trustee shall exercise its discretion
with liberality to my said wife, and consider her welfare, comfort and happiness prior
to claims of residuary beneficiaries under this trust." (Italics supplied.)
2. The provision of the statute under which the deduction was claimed was
§ 303 (a) (3) of the Revenue Act of 1926, as amended by the Revenue Act of 1932, 47
STAT. 282 (932), 44 STAT. 72 (1926), 26 U. S. C. A. Int. Rev. Acts, pp. 232, 235:
"For the purpose of the tax the value of the net estate shall be determined-(a) In
the case of a resident, by deducting from the value of the gross estate . . . (3) The
amount of all bequests, legacies, devises, or transfers, to or for the use of the United
States, any State, Territory, any political subdivision thereof, or the District of Colum-
bia, for exclusively public purposes, or to or for the use of any corporation organized
and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational pur-
poses. ....
It is noted that the statute employs language that would lead to the conclusion
that the transfer must be an outright one in order for there to be a deduction. How-
ever, there are many cases where the transfer is not immediate; where contingencies
not resolved at the time of the testator's death create a possibility that only a calculable
portion of the bequest will ultimately reach the charity. E. g.-a life estate intervening
between the testator and the charity, requires aid of reliable actuarial data to ascer-
tain present value from future worth. On the problem of valuation, see note 23 infra.
3. Justices Douglas and Jackson dissented in an opinion written by the former.
4. Commissioner v. Merchants National Bank of Boston, 132 F. (2d) 483 (C. C.
A. 1st, I942).
5. Estate of Orzo Miller Field v. Commissioner, 45 B. T. A. 27o (i94i).
326 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
The necessary certainty that must exist for a charitable bequest to
be deductible is not a settled matter.6 Most authorities agree that a be-
quest must have a definite ascertainable value at the moment of the testa-
tor's death, 7 and administrative regulations so state., The decisions, how-
ever, are not consistent, the diversity stemming from the particular approach
of the court. A realistic view such as that suggested by the minority in
the instant case 9 considers -the facts of each individual case and decides
on the basis of probability of uncertainty rather than on the mere possi-
bility.10 The proponents of the other view, including the majority here,:
1
appear to be concerned with legal niceties in finding a likelihood of the
corpus being invaded.
1 2  If the standards controlling the permissive inva-
6. See the instant case at iO and footnotes 4 and 5. One authority has expressed
the problem, "Can it be valued as of the date of death with any certainty? Certainty,
of course, is a relative word." I PAuL., FEDERAL ESTATE AND G FT TAXATION (1942)
§ 12.24 at 679.
7. Humes v. U. S., 276 U. S. 487, 48 Sup. Ct. 347, 72 L. Ed. 667 (1928). This
case is discussed in I PAUL, note 6 supra, at 678-679. See also HUGHES, THE FED-
ERAL DEATH TAX (1938) § 140 at 248, and THuRBEm, FEDERAL ESTATE TAX (i921)
§ 174.
8. Treasury Regulations 1O5, § 81.44 (Formerly Art. 44 of Regulation 8o) states:
"If a trust is created for both a charitable and a private purpose deduction may be
taken of the value of the beneficial interest in favor of the former only insofar as such
interest is presently ascertainable, and hence severable from the interest in favor of the
private use ..
Treasury Regulations 105, § 81.46 (Formerly Art. 47 of Regulation 8o) states:
"If as of the date of decedent's death the transfer to charity is dependent upon the per-
formance of some act or the happening of a precedent event in order that it might be-
come effective, no deduction is allowable unless the possibility that charity will nat
take is so remote as to be negligible ...
"If the legatee, devisee donee, or trustee is empowered to divert the property or
fund, in whole or in part, to a use or purpose which would have rendered it, to the
extent that it is subject to such power, not deductible had it been directly so bequeathed,
devised, or given by the decedent, deduction will be limited to that portion, if any, of
the property or fund which is exempt from an exercise of such power." (Italics sup-
plied.) For other reference to these regulations see note 23 infra.
9. "The mere possibility of invasion of corpus is not enough to defeat deduction
the frugality and conservatism of this New England corporate trustee, the
habits and temperament of this sixty-seven year old lady, her scale of living, the nature
of the investments-these facts might well make certain what on the face of the will
might appear quite uncertain." (Italics supplied.) 64 Sup. Ct. 1o8, 112, 113, 88 L. Ed.
55, 59 (1943).
io. The leading case on the problem, states the test as follows: "There was no
uncertainty appreciably greater than the general uncertainty that attends human af-
fairs." Ithaca Trust Co. v. U. S., 279 U. S. 151, 154, 49 Sup. Ct. 291, 73 L. Ed. 647,
649 (1929) ; 9 B. U. L. REv. 288. In U. S. v. Provident Trust Co., .29I U. S. 272, 54
Sup. Ct.389, 78 L. Ed. 793 (1934), (1933) 47 HARv. L. RE. io6i, the court rejected
the formerly held presumption that a woman was always capable of bearing children. A
deduction of the bequest to charity was permitted upon a showing that the removal of
reproductive organs resulted in a practical impossibility of her issue defeating the be-
quest. See also First National Bank of Birmingham v. Snead, 24 F. (2d) 186 (C. C.
A. 5th, 1928) ; (1927-) 41 HARv. L. REv. 8oi, and Commissioner v. F. G. Bonfils Trust,
II5 F. (2d) 788 (C. C. A. ioth, 194o) ; (1941) 41 COL. L. REV. 754.
ii. "At the very least a possibility that part of the principal will be used is then
created, and the present value of the remainder which the charity will receive becomes
less readily ascertainable." (Italics supplied.) 64 Sup. Ct.. 1O8, III, 88 L. Ed. 55, 58
(1943).
12;. "This case happens to be one in which, in view of the large amount of the
residuary estate, the small size of the contingent bequests and the age of the parties,
the percentage of error in any guess at the amount which will go to charity is likely
to be small, but the fact that such cases will arise does not call for encroachment upon
the plain policy of the law." Pennsylvania Co. for Insurances on Lives and Granting
Annuities v. Brown, 6 F. Supp. 582, 584 (D. C. Pa. 1933). The dissenting opinion in
Commissioner v. F. G. Bonfils Trust, note io supra, contends that since deductions
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sion of the corpus are susceptible of accurate measurement by statistical
data or other accepted technique, the present value of the bequest to charity
may be determined' 3 and accordingly deducted. Deduction has been
allowed by the Supreme Court when the principal might have been reached
to provide the widow with "comfort as she now enjoys," 14 and in the
circuit courts, for the "proper support and comfort" of widow,' 5 "comfor-
table maintenance and support," 1 or "comfort, maintenance and sup-
port." 17 On the other hand, circuit courts have been unable to find any
definite standard when the trustee was permitted to use "so much of the
principal . . . as may be needed" to pay annuities,' 8 to invade corpus if
necessary because of "serious illness, physical or mental incapacity," '19 to
provide for relatives "in case they are in need," 20 to provide "so much
. . . as [wife] may . . . need or desire" 21 or to provide "proper care
and comfort." 22 The instant decision in holding "happiness" to be an
immeasurable standard does not contribute to a resolution of the conflicting
views, but it does indicate that the present court intends to construe tax
statutes and the accompanying regulations 23 rather strictly.
Trade Unions-Suability in State Court in Association Name-
Plaintiff was employed by defendant union to check the weight of coal
mined by union members,' and was paid out of union funds. Plaintiff, in
a state court, sued the union in its common name for overtime and other
compensation under provisions of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act.2
Held, under the right conferred by the federal statute, following a deci-
are a matter of legislative grace they should be strictly construed, and in Gammans v.
Hassett, 121 F. (2d) 229, 235 (C. C. A. ist, 1941) Judge Magruder, in concurring,
states that the "Ithaca Trust case must be considered as going to the very verge of the
law . .
13. Treasury Regulations 105, § 8r.io, deals at great length with valuation. On
this problem see also 2 PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION (1942) c. I8.
14. "The standard was fixed in fact and capable of being stated in definite terms
of money. It was not left to the widow's discretion." Ithaca Trust Co. v. U. S., note
io supra, at 154.
15. First National Bank of Birmingham v. Snead, 24 F. (2d) i86 (C. C. A. 5th,
1928) ; (1927) 41 HARv. L. Rxv. 8oi.
I6. Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co. v. Eaton, 36 F. (2d) 7,o (C. C. A. 2d, 1929);
(930) 4 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 319.
17. Lucas v. Mercantile Trust Co., 43 F. (2d) 39 (C. C. A. 8th, 1930).
I8. Boston Safe Deposit and Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 66 F. (2d) 179 (C. C.
A. ist, 1933).
ig. McDonald v. Welch, 17 F. Supp. 549 (D. C. Mass. 1936).
20. Knoernschild v. Commissioner, 97 F. (2d) 213 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938).
21. Gammons v. Hassett, 121 F. (2d) 229 (C. C. A. ist, 194).
22. Helvering v. Union Trust Co., 125 F. (2d) 401 (C. C. A. 4th, 1942).
23. The majority in the instant case points out that the statute under consideration
was substantially reenacted after the Treasury Regulations had been promulgated. It
is suggested that such legislative action indicates approval of the administrative inter-
pretation and should be accorded considerable weight by the courts. Helvering v. Win-
mill, 305 U. S. 79, 83, 59 Sup. Ct. 45, 46, 83 L. Ed. 52, 55 (1938) ; Taft v. Commis-
sioner, 304 U. S. 351, 58 Sup. Ct. 891, 8z L. Ed. 1393, 116 A. L. R. 346 (1938). This
view, however, has been criticized in an article in which the author finds nothing sacred
about such regulations, and considers them merely aids and certainly not more binding
on the courts than any other available device. Brown, Regulations, Reenactment and
the Revenue Acts (ig4i) 54 HARV. L. REV. 377.
i. Ky. REv. STAT. (I943) §'352.53o, provides that when a majority of the miners
request the owner of the mine to allow the miners to employ at their own expense, a
person to check the weight of coal mined by them, the owner shall permit such person
to be employed.
2. 52 STAT. io6o (938), 29 U. S. C. A. § 201 (I942).
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sion of the United States Supreme Court,'. the union was suable in its
common name even in the absence of a state enabling statute. Williams
v. United Mine Workers, 294 Ky. 520, 172 S. W. (2d) 202 (1943).
Over two decades ago in the Coronado Coal Co. decision the Supreme
Court of the United States recognized that members of a labor union could
be sued in their common name.4 Once decided it has been consistently fol-
lowed in the federal courts.5 Whether that holding should be limited to
those particular facts or liberally viewed in respect to the general law of
unincorporated associations became the subject of much legal debate.6
Many states still follow the common law rule that members of a voluntary
unincorporated association can neither sue nor be sued in their association
name,7 and apply the rule to unincorporated labor unions.8 In the absence
of an enabling statute some courts have expressly refused to follow the
doctrine of the Coronado case? In England the common law was changed
by statute ' 0 and its judicial interpretation," but the statute was later mod-
ified by exempting union funds from tort liability incurred in the further-
ing of labor disputes.32 Even in the absence of statutes,' state courts
professing adherence to the common law rule have avoided it when, in
individual cases, following it would produce unfair results.14 The rule is
3. United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344, 66 L. Ed. 975, 42
Sup. Ct. 570, 27 A. L. R. 762 (i922).
4. Note 3 supra.
5. Bartling v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 4o F. Supp. 366 (E. D.
Mich. 1941) ; Dean v. Longshoreman's Association, I7 F. Supp. 748 (W. D. La. 1936) ;
Christian v. International Association of Machinists, 7 F. (2d) 481 (E. D. Ky. 1925) ;
FED. RuLE s Crv. PRoc. (I939, Rule 17 (b).
6. That the controversy waged hot and heavy, Cf. WARREN, CORPORATE ADvAN.-
TAGES WITHOUT INCORPORATION (1929) with Dodd, Dogma and Practice in the Law
of Associations (1929) 42 HARV. L. REv. 977.
7. An unincorporated association cannot sue or be sued in its common name,
. . . for it is the exclusive prerogative of the government to create corporations,
and invest them with the power of suing, as such, by their corporate name." STORY,
EQUITY PLEADING (9th ed. 1879) § 497.
8. Backins v. United Mine Workers, i5o Ark. 398, 234 S. W. 464 (1921) ; Johns-
ton v. Albritton, ioi Fla. 1285, 134 So. 563 (ig3i) ; O'Jay Spread Co. v. Hicks, i85
Ga. 5o7, 195 S. E. 564 (1938) ; Cahill v. Plumbers' Local 93, 238 II1. App. 323, aff'd,
315 Ill. App. 2I1, 146 N. E. 130 (1925) ; see Ryan v. Ryan, 133 P. (2d) 119, 124 (Kan.
1943) ; Becker v. Calnan, 48 N. E. (2d) 668 (Mass. 1943) ; Forest City Manufactur-
ing Co. v. I. L. G. W. U. Local 304, 233 Mo. App. 935, III S. W. (2d) 934 (938) ;
Hallman v. Wood, Wire, and Metal Lathers' International Union, 219 N. C. 798, 15
S. E. (2d) 361 (1941) ; Industrial Trade Unions of America v. Metayer, 32 A. (2d)
789 (R. I. 1943).
9. Johnston v. Albritton, ioi Fla. 1285, 134 So. 563 (ig3i) ; Cahill v. Plumbers'
Local 93, 238 Ill. App. 123, aff'd, 335 Ill. App. 211, 146 N. E. 130 (1925) ; Tucker v.
Eatough, 186 N. C. 505, 120 S. E. 57 (1923).
Io. Trade Union Act, 1871, 34 & 45 ViCr., c. 31, amended by Trade Union Act,
1876, 39 & 40 VICT., C. 22.
ii. Taff Vale Ry. v. Amalgamated Society of Ry. Servants, 19or [A. C.] 426.
This decision related only to those unions registered under the Acts in note IO supra.
12. Trade Disputes Act, 19o6, 6 Euw. 7, c. 47; but see Trade Disputes Act, 1927,
17 & I8 Gao. 5, c. 22 (immunity withdrawn in cases of illegal strikes or lockouts).
13. Many states permit unions to sue to protect their union label, but it is submit-
ted that such state statutes do not change the common-law rule to any great degree.
A collection of such statutes will be found in Cole, The Civil Suability, at Law, of
Labor Unions (1939) 8 FORDHEAm L. REv. 29, 32 n. 17 et seq.. 14: Compare the following cases with those listed in note 7 supra. Nissen v.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc., 229 Ia. 1028, 295 N. W. 858 (1941);
Lamm v. Stoen, 226 Ia. 622, 284 N. W. 465 (I939) ; Bowers v. Grand International
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 187 Minn. 626, 246 N. W. 362 (1933) ; Clark
v. Grand Lodge of Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen. 328 Mo. 1084, 43 S. W. (2d) 404
(1931) ; -Winchester v. Grand Lodge of Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen, 203 N. C.
735, 367 S. E. 49 (1932).
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one of form rather than substance, and unless taken as a matter of abate-
ment, it is generally considered waived. 15 But there are state statutes
which do render the members of a labor union suable as a group. These
statutes seem to be of three types: (i) The members of the union may
be sued as a group by naming and serving a representative group of union
members to act for the other members as well as for themselves.' 6 (2) An
officer of the union is named as the nominal party plaintiff and/or defendant
who represents all the members of the union.1 (3) The association name
is used in stating the parties to the action.' 8 Almost identical statutes have
been interpreted to allow the union to sue or be sued in one jurisdiction,
while such rights and liabilities are denied in another. 9 State courts by
adopting rules of procedure can accomplish the same end as the statute.
2 0
That the matter is not of little moment is shown by the recognized need
for enabling legislation in jurisdictions where the common law rule still
prevails.21 This need has been reflected by one court's complete reversal
of long standing precedent. 2 2  In view of the numerical size, the business
I5. Franklin Union v. People, 220 II. 355, 77 N. E. 176 (igo6) ; Barnes v. Chi-
cago Typographical Union, 232 Ill. 402, 83 N. E. 932 (igoS) ; Operative Plasterers'
and Cement Finishers' International Association v. Case, 93 F. (2d) 56 (App. D. C.
1937) ; Hotel, Restaurant & Soda Fountain Employees Local Union v. Miller, 272 Ky.
466, 114 S. W. (2d) 501 (1938) ; Sturges, Unincorporated Associations as Parties to
Actions (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 383, 388.
6. Colt v. Hicks, 97 Ind. App. 177, 179 N. E. 335 (933) (action at law by sur-
viving widow for death benefits) ; Note (1942) 37 ILL. L. REv. 70, 73 et seq.; Bran-
son v. Industrial Workers of the World, 3o Nev. 27o, 95 Pac. 354 (908) (action at
law in code state for damages for unlawful boycott of plaintiff's'business).
17. Kirkman v. Westchester Newspapers, 261 App. Div. I8I, 24 N. Y. S. (2d)
86o (1st Dep't. 2942) (president of union maintained a successful action for libel);
N. Y. GEN. Ass'x. LAw (Cahill's Cons. Laws, 1930) c. 20, § 23.
I8. Jardine v. Superior Court, 213 Cal. 302, 2 P. (2d) 756 (ig3i), cert. denied,
284 U. S. 592 (932) (to allow an unincorporated association to be sued in its associ-
ation name is not a denial of due process: CAL. CODE CIVIL PROC. (Deering, 1940
§ 388) ; Grand International Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Couch, 236 Ala.
6ii, 184 So. 173 (2938) (action by union member for breach of contract); Grand
International Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Green, 2IO Ala. 496, 98 So. 569
(1923) (recovery allowed under union issued insurance policy: ALA. CODE ANN.
(Michie, 1940) tit. 7, § 142); International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, etc. v.
Wood, 62 Va. 517, 175 S. E. 45 (I934) (recovery allowed on insurance policy: VA.
CODE ANN. (Michie, 1942) § 6o58).
ig. Where statutes provide that when two or more persons associate in any "busi-
ness" and transact that business under a common name, California, Montana, and Okla-
homa have interpreted this to permit suits against labor unions: CAL. CODE CivIL
PRoc. (Deering, 1941) § 388, interpreted in Deeney v. Hotel & Apartment Clerks'
Union, 134 P. (2d) 328 (2943); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. (Anderson & McFarland,
1935) § go89, see Vance v. McGinley, 39 Mont. 46, 2O2 Pac. 247 (9o9) ; OKLA. STAT.
ANN. (1941) tit. 12, § 182, see United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of Amer-
ica v. McMurtrey, I79 Okla. 575, 66 P. (2d) 1051 (2937) ; while Minnesota courts
have held the statute does not include labor unions: MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927)
§ 928o, interpreted in St. Paul Typothetae v. St. Paul Bookbinders' Union, 94 Minn.
351, 202 N. W. 725 (19o5). Florida courts have held a "co-partnership of several
persons composing a mercantile or other firm" did not apply to a labor union to enable
it to sue under the statute, FLA. Comp. GEN. LAWs ANN. (Skillman, 1927) f§4246,
4248, 425r, interpreted in Johnston v. Albritton, IOI Fla. 1285, 134 So. 563 (2932).
The Massachusetts statute allowing a business trust to be sued in its common name
does not apply to labor unions, MASs. GEN. LAws (1931) c. 182, §§ 1-6, interpreted in
Tyler v. Boot & Shoe Workers' Union, 285 Mass. 54, I88 N. E. 509 (1933).
20. PA. RuLEs Crv. PRoc. (2939), Rule 2153 et seq.
21. McMullen, Actions Against Unincorporated Associations (2939) 13 FLORIDA
L. J. 367.
22. Karges Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated Woodworkers Local Union, 165 Ind.
421, 75 N. E. 877 (1o5). Contra: Colt v. Hicks, 97 Ind. App. 277, 179 N. E. 335
(1933). For an excellent presentation showing the complete about face of the Indiana
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transactions and the vast powers of labor unions, adoption by state courts
of the *doctrine of the Coronado case 28 seems justifiable. But it is to be
emphasized that in the instant case the union was allowed to be sued
under the right conferred by a federal statute, but whether this court would
allow the union to sue or be sued, in the absence of a statute, remains to
be seen.24
United States Courts--Jurisdiction-Federal Courts Must Find
Undecided or Conflicting State Law-Holders of municipal bonds,
alleging diversity jurisdiction, petitioned the Federal District Court to
restrain the City from calling the obligations without paying deferred
interest.' A demurrer was sustained by the District Court on the ground
that the questions of law were determined adversely to plaintiffs in the
State Supreme Court. Without passing on the merits, the Circuit Court
of Appeals dismissed the cause,2 remitting petitioners to the state courts
for a determination of the local law, partly conflictings and partly unde-
cided. 4 Held, judgment reversed, with directions to the Circuit Court to
review the case on the merits. Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 64 Sup.
Ct. 7 (1943).
Ever since the federal judiciary has been required to apply the appro-
priate state law in all actions based on diversity jurisdiction,5 whether at
courts with reference to this subject, see Shockley, Suability of Unincorporated Associ-
ations in Indiana (ig41) 16 IND. L. J. 575.
23. Note 3 supra.
24. See Diamond Block Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, i88 Ky.
477, 222 S. W. 1079 (1920).
i. Having defaulted on interest and principal payments on its indebtedness, the
City of Winter Haven, Florida, issued General Refunding Bonds in exchange for the
original outstanding obligations. The new issue bore an initially lower interest rate
which rose progressively higher until it reached, at the end of a decade, the original
rate of 51/2 or 6 per cent. The differential between the interest rate borne by the orig-
inally outstanding debt and the maturing interest of the new refunding bond was re-
ferred to as deferred interest. The refunding certificate provided that should the city
choose to call and redeem them before maturity, then a designated portion of the
accrued deferred must be paid. Subsequently the Supreme Court of Florida held that
a provision for the payment of deferred interest, inserted without an approving vote
by the freeholders, was void. Thereupon, the city attempted to call for redemption its
General Refunding Bonds, without providing for the payment of any portion of the
deferred interest.
2. 134 F. (24) 202 (C. C. A. 5th, 1943).
3. Article 9, § 6, of the Florida Constitution provides that municipalities "shall
have power to issue bonds only after the same shall have been approved by the ma-
jority of the votes cast" in an election in which a majority of the freeholders shall
participate, but dispenses with the requirement in case of "refunding" bonds. The
Florida decisions were conflicting on the point whether the provisions for the payment
of deferred interest phould be considered as amounting to a new issue. Compare Out-
man v. Cone, 141 Fla. 196, 192 So. 611 (1939) and Andrews v. Winter Haven, 148
Fla. 144, 3 S. (2d) 805 (1941) with Sullivan v. Tampa, ioi Fla. 298, 134 So. 211
(I93I).
4. Section 2o of the Refunding Bonds provided that, if any section be held unen-
forcible, the holders of the new issue are entitled to resume their rights under the orig-
inal bonds which were being refunded, and enforce all claims thereon. Assuming that
the deferred interest provision was unconstitutional, the Florida judiciary never passed
upon the rights of bondholders under § 20.
5. Until Swift v. Tyson, 41 U. S. x, io L. Ed. 865 (I842), was overruled by Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 65, 58 Sup. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188 (938), the fed-
eral courts exercising jurisdiction on the ground of diversity of citizenship were not
bound to follow the decisions of state courts in matters of general commercial law or
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law,8 in equity,7 or involving questions in the conflict of laws,8 juristic
discussions on the nature of law were metaphrased into a search for sources
containing authoritative formulations of state lawf Decisions of inferior
appellate state tribunals,10 or even nisi prius courts of equity with state-
wide jurisdiction "1 are conclusive expressions of local state law in the
absence of an opinion by a higher court, even as are the "considered
dicta" 12 of the highest bench in cases "balanced with doubt." 1 Never-
theless, in the absence of any local decision on the point, or in the presence
of conflicting or doubtful judicial utterances, the federal judges have gen-
erally predicted the future state law and decided the case in agreement
with that prognostication.' 4 However, the Supreme Court has held that
where local property rules were unsettled, a trustee in bankruptcy must
submit the question of title of realty in his possession to the state courts
for adjudication. 5  On other occasions complicated issues of state law
have been remanded to the local courts for determination, either because
a concurring suit between the same parties was pending in the state
court,'6 or to avoid a decision on a constitutional point, 7 or to prevent
interference with a local governmental agency.'8 Indeed, federal procedure
of a general nature. Since the latter case, in all cases grounded on diversity of citi-zenship, as distinguished from those based on the presence of a "federal question," the
state law, as "declared by its legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a de-
cision," Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188
(1938), must be applied. For the effect of the new decision upon facts similar to theinstant case see Long, -A Warning Signal for Municipal Bondholders (1939) 37 MIca.
L. Rv. 589.
6. Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188
(0938).
7. Russel v. Todd, 309 U. S. 280, 6o Sup. Ct. 527, 84 L. Ed. 754 (I94o).
8. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U. S. 487, 6I Sup. Ct 1020, 85
L. Ed. 1477 (1941). See Broh-Kahn, Uniformity Runs Riot (94) 31 Ky. L. J. 99,
116; Note (941) 75 So. CALIF. L. REv. 95.
9. See Stimson, Swift v. Tyson-What Remains? (1938) 24 CoRN. L. Q. 54, and
Hutcheson, Status of the Rule of Judicial Precedent (1940) 14 U. OF CIN. L. REv. 259.
lo. Six Companies v. Joint Highway District, 311 U. S. i8o, 61 Sup. Ct. i86, 85
L. Ed. 114 (1940) ; West v. American Telegraph and Telephone Co., 311 U. S. 223, 61
Sup. Ct. 179, 85 L. Ed. 139 (1940). A criticism of these cases will be found in Cor-
bin, The Laws of the Several States (194) 50 YALE L. J. 762; Broh-Kahn, note 8
supra.
ii. Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U. S. 169, 61 Sup. Ct 176, 85 L. Ed.
lO9 (294o). See Notes (1941) 7 U. OF PtE. L. REv. 249, (ig4i) 15 So. CALIF. L.
R-v. 71, [1941] Wis. L. REV. 528.
12. Hawks v. Hammill, 288 U. S. 53, 59, 53 Sup. Ct. 240, 242, 77 L. Ed. 61o, 617(1933).
13. Hawks v. Hammill, 288 U. S. 53, 53 Sup. Ct. 240, 77 L. Ed. 61o (933).
14. Schwager v. Schwager, 1O9 F. (2d) 754 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940) ; Seaboard
Mutual Casualty Co. v. Profit, io8 F. (2d) 597 (C. C. A. 4th, 1940); Samuels v.
Quartin, lo8 F. (2d) 789 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940). See Stearns, Erie Railroad v. Tomp-
kins (1939) 12 ROCKY MT. L. REv. I.
15. Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 3o9 U. S. 478, 6o Sup. Ct. 628, 84 L.
Ed. 876 (1940) ; discussed in (1940) 53 H. v. L. REV. 1394, (1940) 7 U. OF CHI. L.
REv. 727, and Note '(1941) 54 HAv. L. REv. 1379, 1389.
16. Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairy, 316 U. S. 168, 62 Sup. Ct. 986, 86 L. Ed. 135501942).
17. Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496, 61 Sup. Ct. 643, 85 L. Ed.
971 (1941) ; Gilchrist v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 279 U. S. 159, 49 Sup. Ct.
282, 73 L. Ed. 652 (1929). See Note (194) 54 HAv. L. REv." 1379.
I8. Railroad Commission v. Rowan Nichols Co., 311 U. S. 570, 61 Sup. Ct 343,
85 L. Ed. 358 (1941) ; Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U. S. 315, 63 Sup. Ct. io98, 87 L.
Ed. 999 (943) (Justice Frankfurter dissenting strongly). See Note (1941) 54 HARV.
L. REv. 1379. Cf. Public Utilities Commission v. United Fuel Gas Co., 317 U. S. 456,
63 Sup. Ct. 369 (194).
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seemed teeming with a new technique of referring difficult questions of
state law to the state courts so that the advantages of an interpretation by
the indigenous judicial system, sensitive to the "tacit assumptions" 19 and
"subtle implications" 2 0 of the autochthonous tradition would not hinge on
the citizenship of the adversary.21 Forcing the courts of the United. States
to sound for a state law which is either undeclared or conflicting, quenches
this tendency. As psychological factors would possibly lead federal judges
to equate future state law with personal notions of justice, Erie Railroad
v. Tomki= 22 loses some criticized aspects as the creative urgings of these
justices are legitimatized again.2' But an adjudication by a judge power-
less to stamp binding precedent on the subject matter before him, incapable
even of declaring a rule which need remain no more than momentarily
valid for the instant case, 24 seems to offer, not the same law to suitors in
the state and federal courts, but gives to the litigants in the state courts a
rule with some probability of achieving duration, while parties in the
federal courts must remain satisfied with a decision possessing little of the
coin of predicability.
Wills-Construction-Designation of Devisees and Legatees and
Their Respective Shares-Devise to Named "Heirs" Who Do Not In-
clude All the Ultimate Heirs-A bachelor testator devised his estate
"to my legal heirs, who are as follows :", giving the names and addresses
of a full brother and five half nieces and nephews. He also "cut off" a
missing half nephew, Lyon, with a nominal bequest of ten dollars, "if [he]
h __-dbe living." Unknown to the testator Lyon had died leaving three
hildren, who were technically legal heirs. In construing the will the Court
held: (I) that the gift to Lyon was conditional and had failed, leaving his
descendants nothing; (2) that the beneficiaries were only the "known
heirs" of the testator; (3) that the division of shares should be per stirpes,
rather than per capita, in accord with the statute of descent and distribu-
tion. First Trust Company v. Meyers, 174 S. W. (2d) 378 (Mo. I943).1
The words "my legal heirs," when used in their technical sense, re-
quire both the identification of the beneficiaries and the definition of their
shares by resort to the statute of descent and distribution 2  But where the
beneficiaries are specifically named there is no question of identification,
19. Diaz v. Gonzalez, 261 U. S. lO2, io6, 43 Sup. Ct. 286, 67 L. Ed. 550 (1923).
20. Hawks v. Hammill, 288 U. S. 53, 57, 53 Sup. Ct. 240, 241, 77 L. Ed. 616
(1933).
21. See Frankfurter and Landis, The Pusiness of the Supreme Court at October
Term, 1928 (1929) 43 HARV. L. REv. 33, 61.
22. 304 U. S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188 (938).
23. Hutcheson, Status of the Rule of Judicial Precedent (194o) 14 U. OF CIx. L.
RV. 259, 272.
24. In Vanderbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 311 U. S. 538, 61 Sup. Ct. 347, 85
L. Ed. 327 (1941), it was held that if the highest court of a state, pending an appeal to
the Circuit Court of Appeals, overrules an earlier decision upon which the District
Court had relied in rendering a judgment that was concededly correct at the time of
entry, the appellate court must reserve the judgment and conform to the state law at
the time of the entry of judgment on appeal.
i. One Justice concurring, seriatim; one Justice concurring in part and dissenting
in part (holding that the three unknown heirs were not disinherited) ; two Justices dis-
senting (holding that the gifts were only to named individuals who took per capita).
It was also decided that the brother, as a collateral heir of the full blood, was en-
titled to a "double portion." Mo. STAT. ANN. (1932) § 309, p. 297.
2. Irvine v. Ross, 339 Mo. 692, 98 S. W. (2d) 763 (1936).
RECENT CASES
and the definition of their shares depends upon the testator's manifested
intent. If no intent is expressed, the surrounding circumstances win
govern." In the instant case, where both modes of description were used,
two ambiguities resulted: first, the named donees did not include all the
testator's legal heirs; 4 second, the method of share distribution was not
specifically indicated. The Court attempted to resolve the first ambiguity
by limiting the technical use of "heirs" to the testator's "known heirs" at.
the time of the making of the will.5 The fallacy therein lies in the fact that
one's legal heirs cannot be ascertained until his death.6 Either "my legal
heirs" should be construed as the real disposing words, so that the entire
estate would be completely distributed according to the statute of descent;
or they should be held merely descriptive, so that the devise would be only
to named persons as devisees and not as heirs.7  The latter construction
seems more desirable as it would designate the "known heirs" as the bene-
ficiaries without any objectionable legal reasoning. However, the Court
felt, in view of the second ambiguity, that a per stirpian distribution was
necessary; 8 and that such distribution could not be reconciled with the
above construction. This was because the Court assumed that a gift to the
named relatives would be a gift to a "class," and that in any class gift
distribution is necessarily per capita. The assumption was unfortunate in
that no "class" problem was actually involved; the gift being immediate,
and the beneficiaries being definitely ascertained as only those donees
named.9 Even if there were a class gift it is well settled that the distribu-
3. This includes the presumption that if no intent was expressed a division corre-
sponding to the statute of descent is more likely than any other to correspond with
what the testator would have wished had he thought about it at all. Lyon v. Acker, 33
Conn. 222, 223 (1866) ; New York Life Ins. and Trust Co. v. Winthrop, 237 N. Y. 93,
142 N. E. 431 (1923). Contra: Cuthbert v. Laing, 75 N. H. 304, 73 Atl. 641 (I9O9).
4. See Gardner v. Vanlandingham, 334 Mo. 1O54, iO62, 69 S. W. (2d) 947, 950
(1934). "The word 'heir,' unqualified by any adjective, is a technical word . ..
Laymen often use the word 'heirs' as meaning 'heirs apparent,' usually thinking of de-
scendants." See Ferrier, Gifts to "Heirs" in California (1938) 26 CALIF. L. REv. 413;
Harper and Heckel, The Doctrine of Worthier Title (1930) 24 ILL. L. REv. 627.
5. This reasoning seems contrary to Missouri decisions that hold, (I) where there
is an attempt to exclude those who would otherwise take as heirs, suich exclusion must
be clearly expressed or result imperatively from the general intent as ascertained from
the entire instrument, 3o3 Mo. 94, 103, 260 S. W. 73, 75 (1924) ; (2) that even where
the general intent would seem to imply an exclusion, the descendant was allowed to
take because there was no express exclusion found in the instrument. Evans v. Ran-
kin, 329 Mo. 411, 418, 44 S. W. (2d) 644, 647 (1931). •
One Justice argues that "From the fact that the testator desired to disinherit . . .
Lyon, it does not logically follow that he desired to disinherit his children of whose
existence he was unaware." Instant case at 387.
6. Note 4 supra.
7. The courts favor gifts to individuals. Westerfelt v. Smith, 202 Iowa 966, 211
N. W. 38o (1926). There the gift was of the residue of his estate to his lawful heirs,
A, B, C, and D (all heirs were named but one). The gift was held to be to individ-
uals rather than to a class. See Note (1927) 13 IowA L. REv. 9o.
8. Note 3 supra.
9. A technical class gift is one in which the beneficiaries are subject to either in-
crease or decrease, or both, pending a ffiture time set for distribution, thus presenting
a problem of survivorship in case of decrease (for only those surviving to that time
would share); and also presenting the question of whether the gifts are contingent
until the time for distribution and enjoyment, or vested subject to total or partial di-
vestment. See 3 PAGE, WILLS (194) § 1046.
Another reason for not interjecting the "class" problem is that the common law
rule in favor of survivors in claims of "class" devisees is abrogated by Mo. STAT. ANNw.
(1932) § 527, p. 321. Snow v. Ferril, 320 Mo. 543, 8 S. W. (2d) ioo8 (1928). See
Cooley, "Lapse Statutes" and their Effect on Gifts to Classes (1936) = VA. L. REV.
373.
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tion could be, under varying conditions, either per capita or per stirpes.10
Nor does the presumption that the distribution of a gift to named indi-
viduals is to be made per capita militate against a per stirpian distribution
if the testator's intent or the surrounding circumstances so indicate."-
Therefore it is submitted that the proper legal construction of the will
would have been to consider the words "legal heirs" as merely descriptive,
and then decide the question of share distribution solely by reference to
the surrounding circumstances '2--- which clearly justified a per stirpian dis-
tribution."" Thus the Court's ultimate result would be preserved without
interjecting confusing legal refinements.
10. 3 PAGE, WILLS (1941) §§ 1077, 1078.
ii. The presumption yields to evidence of a testator's contrary intention. Claude
v. Schutt, 211 Iowa 117, 233 N. W. 41 (1930). See also Dolander v. Dhaemers, 297
Ill. 274, 13o N. E. 705 (92).
12. Gannett v. Shepley, 172 S. W. (2d) 857 (Mo. 1943) uses the surrounding cir-
cumstances to determine the intended beneficiaries. The court in the instant case sug-
gests that ". . . the same rule shall apply when there is doubt as to the amount of the
estate going to a beneficiary." Instant case at 383.
13. Instant case at 382.
